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Abstract:
The Late Roman Republic was divided into two political factions, the Populares and the
Optimates, who quarreled on whether the voice of the people through votes in popular
assemblies should have greater weight in government than the opinions and wisdom of
the Roman Senate who, being composed of elite Roman aristocrats, believed were more
qualified than the average Roman citizens to govern. A parallel idea of representation
exists in the United States, in which two schools of thought emerge, the Trustee Model of
Representation versus the Delegate model. In this project, I analyzed the language and
rhetoric utilized by ancient Roman authors and thinkers regarding these two political
factions and compared those trends to political writings from 18th century America that
were concerned about representation. Ultimately, I was able to find a strong connection
between the ideologies of the Roman conflict between the Optimates and Populares and
the American debate over whether a Trustee or Delegate model of representation is more
effective. There has been significant research done on the Late Roman Republic and the
conflicts that categorized America’s founding, but my research was able to connect the
two political contexts and hopefully, provide a foundation for future research on the links
between the ancient world and the United States.
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Introduction
Both the United States Senate and the Senate of the Roman Republic share similar
schools of thought regarding the obligations of an elected senator, focusing mainly on
whether these politicians represent the interests of the common people or if these
politicians should make decisions on what they deem “for the good of the whole” nation
(Rehfeld). While the Roman Senate differs from the United States Senate in that it is not
a legislative body, the argument between the Populares and the Optimates is similar to
the American conflict between a delegate model of representation, in which elected
officials should directly represent and vote on the interests of their constituents, versus a
trustee model of representation, where politicians are elected because they possess the
“most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of society” and
therefore, are more qualified to make decisions on behalf of the American people
(Madison). Extensive research exists on the history of the Populares and the Optimates
and the influential leaders attributed to each party, and yet there seems to be a lack of
research regarding how we can take that conflict and translate it to modern models of
democracy and representation.
In the late Republic of Rome, the political life was categorized by two schools of
thought, the Optimates, who believed that the advice and approval of Roman Senators
should be a more important step for the creation of a law, and the Populares, who
believed that the votes of the Roman populace as whole through assemblies should hold a
greater weight in the creation of law. On a similar note, when the United States
government was being constructed for a second time, after the failed Articles of
Confederation, the two political factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, argued
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over how American citizens should be represented in a legislative institution. The
Federalists argued for a trustee model of representation which draws comparisons to the
Roman Optimates in believing that American senators should make decisions based on
their own wisdom and what they deem fit. On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists
supported a delegate model of representation claiming that American senators should be
defined by their constituents and make decisions based on the interests of those
constituents (Ginsberg 53). I believe that this research will recognize the ways in which
both of these approaches to representation have merit but will also highlight the pitfalls of
entrusting a large amount of political power in the hands of one group of individuals,
whether it be political elites or the common people.
For my research, I used primary and secondary analysis to gather information
regarding these two political ideologies in the Roman and American contexts. I will focus
on the writings, letters, and speeches of key Roman politicians such as the great Roman
orator Cicero and Julius Caesar, along with works of other Roman historians and
previous research focusing on the Roman Republic. Specifically, I used content analysis
to code for specific words, phrases, or sentiments in their original Latin that were being
utilized to describe the political factions, and then translated those ideas such as “liberty,”
“interests of the commons,” or “virtue” (Cicero 225). On a similar note, I then coded for
these words and concepts in the American context. Specifically, I looked at early
documents such as the Constitution and the Federalist Papers, but also analyzed
contemporary sources as well, such as public opinion polls and demographics of
American legislators. Ultimately, I was able to find similar trends in language and
rhetoric used by these two factions, the Optimates and the Populares, and those used in
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18th century America regarding representation. This suggests a significant link between
the political culture of the ancient Romans at the end of the Republic and the concerns of
the framers of American democracy.

Historical Context
Most of the limited information we have about the beliefs, actions, and prominent
figures of the Optimates and Populares comes from the written accounts of the either the
leaders who aligned themselves with a specific ideology or from historians who are
documenting these political debates. Therefore, for my research, it seems most effective
to analyze the rhetoric and arguments posed by these men and compare the consistency or
distinctions between the ways in which they describe the values or logic of their own
ideology or the competing ideology. I often found that these political actors often
reference or try to emulate the actions of previous Roman politicians like the Gracchus
brothers or Lucius Sulla. Therefore, this historical context is ultimately important to keep
in mind in order to help inform the context in which Roman historians and politicians like
Sallust and Cicero are writing about these two groups while also identifying the events
that initiated the emergence of these political ideologies in the first place.
In this section, I am going to highlight the historical events that serve as the
backdrop and reference points for the ancient primary sources that I coded for. In order to
understand the ideological foundations of the groups of Optimates and the Populares that
categorized the late Roman Republic, it is significant to acknowledge key moments in
Rome’s history that played a role in the conception of these two political factions, dating
back all the way to Rome’s founding in 754/753 BCE when 100 senators were chosen as
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senators and ultimately, created the patrician class. The conflict between the Roman
aristocracy, or patrician class, that served as the ruling body of Rome, and the common
people, is one that had always been present since the birth of Rome, and subsequently,
incited significant political conflicts between the two populations of people. Specifically,
a period of conflict between the two classes called the Struggle of the Orders categorized
Rome’s early Republic which ultimately, led to the creation of the tribune of the plebs, a
key political office that helped assure that the plebeians were protected from the political
abuse of the patrician magistrates. Additionally, the prolonged conflict that later arose
between political heads Sulla, who fought to preserve the aristocratic Senate and its
superior judgement, and Marius, who headed the Populares factions, only heightened and
exacerbated the argument over which body of people ought to have a greater influence in
governance, the aristocratic senators or the plebeians. Years later, during the Civil War of
49 BCE, a war that ultimately led to the collapse of the Roman Republic, the two major
political figures fighting against one another, Caesar and Pompey, were heavily
influenced by the political opinions and values, specifically regarding the role of the
Senate, of Sulla and Marius, therefore making it crucial to highlight their contributions to
this debate. Ultimately, all of these key historical moments left a significant legacy,
especially the division between the aristocratic and plebian classes, that remained well
into the late Roman Republic. Overall, recognizing and analyzing these events helps
inform how these two political ideologies were shaped and the framing of each side’s
arguments.
Moving past the first 200 years or so after Rome’s founding in which seven kings
ruled, the foundation of Rome’s republic began to take shape as early as 504 BCE, with
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figures like Cicero claiming that this expulsion of kings was “synonymous with liberty”
(Le Glay et al. 32). It is during this time that conflicts between the aristocratic members
of Roman society and the common people begin to arise and produce political unrest
within the state. As previously mentioned, this aristocratic class was thought to be the
descendants of forefathers or “patres” of Rome, and so therefore, like a vicious cycle,
these individuals, who were from the wealthiest and most powerful families of Rome,
were then systematically placed in positions of power in Rome like public and religious
offices and the Senate. This gave way for the patrician class to abuse their power and
neglect the interests of the plebeians.
Before jumping into the extensive history of this struggle, it is important to
outline the unique functions of the Roman Senate since it differs significantly from the
structure and expectations of the United States Senate. Specifically, during Rome’s
period of monarchy, this Roman Senate served as an advising body to the kings. Once
Rome expelled the kings and transitioned to a system of annually elected officials, the
Senate then acted as an advising body to the elected magistrates. A distinction to make,
which will inform the rest of my research, is that the Senate did not possess the ability to
create laws, and instead, were only able to pass decrees regarding the Senate’s opinion on
what the magistrates ought to do, which in itself held significant weight. In Rome, laws
were voted on and enacted by the popular assemblies, but the opinion of the Senate was
usually given before any piece of legislation became law. Therefore, the Senate still held
a major influence over the creation of laws and the actions of the magistrates and could
enact that influence in order to repress the common people especially since it had major
influences over the State’s finances and helped determine the distribution of wealth from
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the treasury. Ultimately, those, both poor and wealthy, who contested this political
organization, that clearly favored the patricians, were labelled as “plebeians” even though
this term was later understood to simply represent the “common people” (Le Glay et. al
43). Understandably, these plebeians, who represented the majority, grew angry at this
arrangement, and in turn, engaged in political protest in order to effect change.
These conflicts, which began around 494, would come to be known as the
Struggle of the Orders in which the plebeian class rebelled against the patrician’s
monopoly on both political and religious power, and their greater access to resources. In
the early formation of the state and in wake of the removal of the kings, the plebeians
found themselves plagued with “bad harvests” and a “shortage of food” along with the
burden of significant debt, which served as a stark contrast to those of the patrician class
(Le Glay et al. 45). The plebeians began to push back against the aristocratic rule. On one
specific occasion, the plebeians, in protest of their “lack of representation” in political
processes and “heavy debts,” retreated to the Sacred Mount, depriving the patricians of
their manual labor workers and threatening the formation of a new state. Therefore, this
forced the patricians to create the position of Tribune of the plebs, which would become a
significant political office for the common people to have their interests represented in
the formation of Roman law (Le Glay et al. 43).
Overall though, the patricians persisted in their attempts to exclude the plebeians
from political participation, and specifically the consulship, which is the elected head of
state of the Republic which is voted on annually. For example, a specific patrician-born
hero and general named Coriolanus who lived during the 5th century BCE was
determined to maintain the patrician class’ rule over the plebeians. In 491 BCE, Rome,
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who was experiencing a grain shortage, had just received an abundance of grain from
Sicily and the Senate was deciding on what price it should be sold to the common people.
Coriolanus argued that the plebeians should not receive any grain unless they “restore to
the Senate its ancient rights” meaning abolish the offices of the tribunes (Livy 2.331). He
despised the “plebeian magistrates” and clearly believed that the plebeians were not fit
for governance (Livy 2.331). Understandably the plebeians were outraged by Coriolanus’
actions, but even the Senate found Coriolanus’ opinions and plans to be a bit too harsh,
and ultimately, he was put on trial and convicted, although the Senate did try to argue for
a lighter sentence. This is an example of the tumultuous relationship between the
plebeians and the patricians. In 367 BCE, due to the Licinio-Sextian plebiscite, plebeians
gained greater access and influence in political decisions by requiring that one of the two
consuls be a plebeian. This was important considering that before this time the plebeians
were excluded from these high offices, and it allowed for the interests of the common
people to have better representation in governance. While plebeians were able to make
significant strides in gaining entry to Roman governance, the divide between the elite
patrician class and the common people still remained.
Moving forward in time to 133 BCE, two political figures, Tiberius and Gaius
Gracchus, enter the political arena in hopes of alleviating the hardships placed on those
lower-class Roman individuals who were, at this time, facing economic and social
problems. Specifically, the plebeian class, who were mainly dependent on agriculture for
their livelihoods, were being required to serve in Rome’s military service for a significant
period of time, and in their absence, their land would either fall to shambles or be sold off
to the wealthy. Furthermore, those who purchased this land would then profit even more
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off of this transaction by working the land with slave labor. Once elected as Tribune of
the Plebs, Tiberius Gracchus attempted to propose legislation that would solve these
seemingly unjust actions that were being inflicted upon the lower classes. Believing that
the Senate would reject his proposal due to the fact that many of the wealthy senators
were profiting off the current arrangement, Tiberius took his proposed legislation straight
to the popular assembly, completely bypassing the Senate’s approval. This action
highlights a key distinction that highlights the foundation of the Populares, which is
whether the opinions of the people should have a larger weight in law-making than the
authority of the Senate.
Ultimately, this action, along with his desire to run for Tribune a second time,
caused the Senate to deem Tiberius as dangerous and possessing too much “ambition”
and he subsequently was murdered. It also set a precedent in the early Roman Republic.
The issue was not necessarily centered around his desire to pass legislation that would
benefit the plebeians like the land reform bills, but instead, it was the manner in which he
did it. He had chosen to break the traditional and understood procedure for how laws
were created in Rome by going around the Senate’s approval, which in fairness was
completely legal. The Senate obviously saw him as a threat to their power and influence
over governance and thought his actions would encourage others to follow suit.
Therefore, Tiberius was seen as the making of a Tyrant, and his radical actions ultimately
led to his murder at the hands of the Senate. This is also shows the means by which the
Senate were willing to utilize in order to repress any opposition or threat to their power.
In terms of the debate between the Populares and the Optimates, this struggle reveals just
how much influence the Senate has in dominating any opposing force, and how they can
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use their rhetoric and position to do so all in the name of what it best for Rome. It is clear
though that Tiberius’ legacy acted as a catalyst for future populist movements.
Following in his brother’s footsteps, Gaius Gracchus, who was also elected
tribune of the plebs in 123 BCE, focused on reinstating his brother’s law regarding land
rights, while also attempting to enact other laws to benefit the common people. He too,
like Tiberius, chose to take these laws straight to the popular assemblies, completely
bypassing the approval of the Senate. Similarly, ambitious like his brother, Gaius
attempted to run for his third tribunate. However, after the Senate ordered an ultimate
decree following the death of a servant to the consul, meaning the consuls were allowed
to take any actions as long as it is the best interest of the state, Gaius feared for his safety
and took refuge on Aventine hill where he and his supporters were killed (Le Glay et al.
113). The actions of the Gracchus brothers and their deaths are significant to the
formation and foundation of the Optimates and Populares. These two brothers set the
precedent that the implementation of laws was not contingent on the Senate’s approval,
and the interests of the common people would be better represented in governance if they
were to evade the Senate’s advising which had become an accepted and integral part of
Roman governance. There reason for doing this is twofold. While they truly did wish to
pass legislation that ultimately aided to poorer Roman citizens, they ultimately thought
the Roman Senate had excess power and that the authority of the Roman governance
ought to be based in the votes of the people in assemblies.
After these events, two “fluid” groups “within the wealthy elite” emerged, with
the major conflict being whether to take laws or other political decisions straight to public
assemblies for public approval and by-passing the Senate, just like Tiberius Gracchus did,
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or to present these ideas first to the Senate for approval. This is a key frame of reference
for understanding the beliefs and motivations for the Optimates and the Populares.
Ultimately, the legacy and conflicts left by the Gracchi brothers maintained into the late
Roman Republic, and prominent political figures and orators, such as Cicero, often
referred back to these incidents as either support for the importance of the general
masses’ influence in law-making or evidence of the dangerous and foolish events that
happen when decisions are left in the hands of the people.
The Gracchus brothers highlighted a key debate within Roman governance
regarding whether the Senate’s approval was really necessary for the creation of laws and
if assemblies could be used to circumvent this aristocratic institution. The conflict
between political figures Marius and Sulla, that caused a war and a further divide among
the people of Rome, seems to present both sides of this debate. Marius was a man who
was not born into nobility or the patrician class but was instead sponsored and groomed
by a wealthy patron family, the Metelli, to enter the political realm and rise to the
senatorial class. Specifically, Marius’ fame is mainly attributed to his incredible military
successes during the war against Jugurtha and the German wars, which ultimately
garnered him such popularity that he held six consulships between the years 108-100
BCE. However, his popularity began to decline near the end of his final consulship in 99
BCE in which he became entangled in a conflict between other Populares political
figures, Lucius Saturninus and Gaius Glaucia, who were attempting to pass legislation in
favor of “land allotment” to the veterans of the wars which Marius led (Le Glay et al.
127). Assuming that the senators would discredit the law, the men who created it
included a requirement that the senators take an oath in order to obey the vote, or else
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they would be banished from Rome. Ultimately, Marius took the oath, much to the
dismay of other senators such as his former patron Quintus Metellus. Additionally,
Marius was blamed for a handful of future riots and disturbances which contributed to his
decline, as he was blamed for the disturbances caused by Saturninus who enlisted a gang
to kill his political rival for the consulship in 99 BCE (Le Glay et al. 127). Overall
though, it was clear, due to his humble upbringing and his position on legislation that
benefitted the common people, that Marius supported and considered himself a member
of the Populares. It is important to understand the trajectory of Marius’ life in order to
grasp how he was viewed by the Roman people and the Senate, and to provide context to
his conflicts with Sulla.
Lucius Sulla, on the other hand, presents a stark contrast to Marius, and is
described as the major leader and supporter of the Optimates. In contrast, he was born
into an old aristocratic family, the Cornelii. Interestingly, Sulla actually served as
quaestor under Marius’ command during the war against Jugurtha, which is thought to be
the origin of tension between the two political leaders. While Marius’ political career
began to deteriorate, Sulla’s began to rise, and he quickly gained a reputation as being
both a great military leader, being accredited for the victory of Jugurtha, much to Marius’
dismay, and “a wise diplomat” (Le Glay et al. 130). Ultimately, their conflict comes to a
head when Marius, with support of the Populares who favored him because of his support
for pro-plebeian legislation and because he was not a born aristocrat, claimed the
command of the military charge against the king of Pontus, Mithridates, whereas Sulla, as
the current consul and with the support of the Senate, had the actual power to lead a
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campaign. In result, Sulla marched legions onto Rome and successfully reclaimed the
campaign on Mithridates while simultaneously banishing Marius from Rome.
Ultimately, Marius died soon after, which led to the height of Sulla’s political
impact. After defeating Cinna and Cinna’s formed army who had attempted to exile him
from Rome in 83 BCE, Sulla took control of the city and began to implement his
“proscription list” which called for the confiscation of resources and or execution of any
people who he deemed “enemies of the state” such as any magistrates who served under
Marius (Le Glay et al. 134). Sulla’s political actions after this time period seem to
solidify his allegiance and belief in the Optimates. Notably when Sulla was granted the
position of dictator for an undecided timeframe, which in a Roman context was a
temporary post of usually about 6 moths appointed by the Senate who maintained sole
military power during a time of emergency, he attempted to restore more power into the
institution of the Senate. He required that the Senate must approve any legislation before
it was presented to the assembly of the people while also restricting the powers of the
Tribunes of the plebs by taking away their ability to veto Senate decisions in order to
restore the superiority of the Senate’s decisions and to repress any opposition.
Overall, the conflict between Sulla and Marius proves that the divide between the
elite and the common people in Rome still persisted nearly 600 years after Rome’s
founding, and affirms that there was still no unanimous opinion on the Republic’s system
of law-making. Additionally, the conflict between these two figures heavily influence and
inform the civil war between Pompey and Caesar that I will touch on more later in my
research, as both of these men had personal and political ties to Sulla and Marius.
Ultimately, these key historical moments led to the creation of the Optimates and
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Populares, where political life was categorized by those aristocratic men who believed
that the advice and approval of Roman Senators, because of their greater wisdom and
character, should be a more important step for the creation of a law, and those who
believed that the votes of the plebs or the common people should hold a greater weight in
the creation of law. In the same vein, the United States has experienced a similar debate
in terms of representation and the roles and expectations of our elected officials.
Debate of Representation in the United States
More specifically, both the United States Senate and the Senate of the Roman
Republic share similar schools of thought regarding the obligations of an elected senator.
In the United States, the debate over the duties and expectations of representation truly
arose around the 18th century around the time of the American Revolution even though
early mentions of this conflict can be traced all the way back to the 13th century and the
Magna Carta (Rehfeld 217). At the time of when the Magna Carta was written,
representatives did not possess any authority really to create laws or act at all, and
instead, they were there mostly to “assent to the King’s demands” on behalf of their town
(Rehfeld 217). However, the actual terms “trustee” and “delegate” came about in the 18th
century, with figures like Edmund Burke, who was a British statesman and political
thinker, writing about their opinions on the matter. More specifically, Burke argues in
favor of a more trustee model of representation, and states in his 1774 “Speech to the
Electors at Bristol at the Conclusion of the Poll” that a representative owes its
constituents their “judgment” and even further argues, that your representative “betrays
you” if he sacrifices that judgement to “your opinion” (Burke). Burke saw representatives
as having the superior qualifications to make decisions on behalf of the people, which
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ultimately is foundational to the argument of the trustee model. Therefore, it is clear that
a debate regarding the expectations of representation was beginning to take shape near
the end of the 18th century, and the founders of the U.S. were taking ideas straight from
Britain.
Early American politicians like James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and
Thomas Jefferson debated whether elected officials ought to represent the interests of the
common people or if these politicians should make decisions on what they deem “for the
good of the whole” nation which seems similar to the debates between the Roman
Optimates and Populares (Madison). Two political ideologies, the Trustee model of
representation and the delegate model, emerge after the American Revolution regarding
the responsibility and responsiveness of the newly created elected officials under the new
Constitution. Furthermore, this ultimately contributed to the beginning of the United
States’ first two political factions which was an act that Washington himself warned
against.
Specifically, the Articles of Confederation was the founder’s first attempt at
establishing a precedent for governance in America, favoring a structure that
concentrated power in the hands of the states and limited the power and interference of
federal government. This emphasis on a weak central government came from a place of
fear, as the founders did not wish to allow an avenue for the rise of an ambitious tyrant
who held an excess of power as was the case with Great Britain under the rule of the
monarch. However, this complete shift, under the Articles of Confederation, to a
governance that was composed solely of a legislative branch, lacking an executive and
judicial, presented the fledgling country with a handful of complications that would
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require a complete rewrite of the document and would ultimately alter the way in which
representation was interpreted in the United States.
For example, the Articles made it difficult for the federal government to exercise
any power over that of state government, especially since the states were responsible for
the enforcement and implementation of the laws. Congress under the Articles of
Confederation had no power to “levy taxes or regulate commerce” and they were unable
to secure a national army because each state had their own militia (Ginsberg 38).
Additionally, all 13 states only had one singular vote in Congress, and it required the
unanimous approval of each state to amend the Articles of Confederation which proved
to be a roadblock. In terms of representation specifically, legislators from each state acted
more as messengers of the decisions being made by their state’s legislators as opposed to
actors who were independently thinking and creating legislation with the interests of the
entire nation in mind. Because most power was found at the state level, these senators
were both selected by state legislators and also susceptible to an “immediate recall” by
state officials, along with being compensated directly from state treasuries (Ginsberg 37).
Overall, under the Articles of Confederation, each state “retained its sovereignty,
freedom, and independence” which in result made Congress ineffective and powerless in
enforcing its will, especially with the absence of an executive or judicial authority to
reinforce the legitimacy of its decisions (Articles of Confederation). Ultimately, this
primary document created and perpetuated a non-unified nation where states were
competing with one another and in their own personal interests. Therefore, it became
apparent that a new document and form of government needed to be constructed.
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During this process of creating, amending, and ratifying the U.S. Constitution,
new avenues for representation were created which ultimately redefined and challenged
the way in which senators and elected officials were expected to act and make decisions
in governance. The most notable change is seen through the establishment of a bicameral
legislation where the framers decided to compromise and adopt two proposed plans
regarding how states would be represented in this new Congress, the Virginia Plan and
the New Jersey Plan. Overall, this decision established that the Senate would consist of
only two representatives from each state, and the House of Representatives would be
composed of varying number of state legislators based on their specific population size.
No longer were legislators bound to the wills of the State governments, but instead, the
framers understood their role now to make independent decisions based on the best
interests of their constituencies, whether that be the State or a specific district, and to the
nation as a whole. The establishment of these two houses would allow for more unity
between rural citizens who preferred a weaker federal government and those who fought
for a more centralized government as it allowed for states to still retain influence in
lawmaking, but also concentrated power more on the national level and in result,
reinforcing the legitimacy of the institution.
As previously mentioned, under the Articles of Confederation, members of
Congress were basically just conduits of the wills and decisions of the state legislators
and were not acting or proposing legislation based on their own expertise or for the whole
of the nation. However, with power now concentrated on the federal level under the
Constitution through the newly constructed legislative branch, representatives were now
responsible with making decisions for the unified nation and keeping checks on the other
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branches along with still representing the interests of their own state. For example, the
question arose whether these representatives should base their decisions on the opinions
of their constituents or the opinions of state legislators or even their own personal
opinions. This gave rise to two competing ideologies which resemble the conflict that
categorized Roman politics regarding the most effective method of representation in
governance regarding whether the Roman Senate possessed a greater wisdom that the
common people to make decisions on behalf of the state.
Two early political factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, argued over
how American citizens should best be represented in a legislative institution. The
Federalists argued for a trustee model of representation, which draws comparisons to the
Roman Optimates, by believing that American senators should make decisions based on
their own wisdom and what they deem fit. Ultimately, the aims and responsibilities that
frame the argument for a trustee model are that the primary goal of legislation should be
“the good of all,” and that elected representatives ought not to be reliant on “external
sanctities” or “the prejudices and acrimony of the party,” but instead utilize their own
judgment and wisdom when making decisions and policy (Rehfeld 218). Basically, they
argued that we elect and entrust these individuals to public offices on the basis that
because they possess some greater expertise and “merit,” they are more equipped to make
decisions for the nation as a whole and not solely based in the views of their constituents
(Madison). This is significant in the sense that it draws strong connections to the ways in
which the Roman Senate saw themselves as being morally superior and “the best men”
which ultimately made them better suited for governance.
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On the other hand, the Anti-Federalists supported a delegate model of
representation claiming that American representatives should be defined by their
constituents and make decisions based on the interests of those constituents, aligning
themselves more with the ideology of the Populares (Madison). Furthermore, the
argument in favor of the delegate model example serves as the antithesis to that of the
trustee model in which the goals of the legislation should be for “a particular electoral
constituency,” and that those constituents, and citizens as a whole, ought to be the
ultimate judge on what is deemed good for the nation (Rehfeld 218). Similarly, the
supporters of the delegate model believe that representatives should be responsive to the
interests of their constituents and reflect those interests in legislation and governance. In
terms of framing these ideas, pure delegates are not to express their own personal opinion
in governance, but rather solely the opinion of their constituents (Cooper et al. 175). On
the other hand, trustees are believed to possess some “objective criteria” and personal
experience on which they base their decisions (Cooper et al 175). Therefore, although the
terms “trustee” and “delegate” have their roots in more modern research regarding
representation, the sentiments remain the same to the arguments that categorized
America’s founding.
As seen in the context of the Roman Republic, significant issues arise with both
of these schools of thought. For example, some scholars of political science would argue
that it is difficult to judge the aptitude and success of elected officials who are not acting
as a delegate, since it proves easier to measure the effectiveness of elected officials using
the delegate model because one would simply have to compare their voting patterns to
the opinions of the constituents (Rehfeld 218). Similarly, it could be argued that the
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trustee model of representation promotes the election of elite, wealthy, and educated
individuals who could potentially be blind to the needs and experiences of the lower-class
citizens or the interests of the majority of citizens which was definitely a fear held by the
Antifederalists (Brutus, Federal Farmer). On the other hand though, Andrew Rehfeld asks
the question of whether citizens are either not educated enough about basic political
processes or possess the necessary and informed worldview needed that will influence
and ultimately enhance their decisions and lawmaking (Rehfeld 224). While both sides of
the argument have valid concerns, it is clear that both sides have the same goal in mind
which is to create a system that best represents the interests of the people and also
maintains the values of the country.
Overall, in this last couple decades, state and national legislators in the United
States are “more likely to characterize themselves as trustees,” which is how framers of
the Constitution like Hamilton and Madison intended it to be, believing that we choose to
elect representatives who ought to use their discretion and wisdom to make decisions for
the good of the nation as a whole (Cooper et al. 175). However, it also seems that the
fears originally held by the pro-agrarian Antifederalists, like the idea that these
representatives will solely belong to an elite class have come into fruition especially
since, as of 2014, the median net-worth of a member of Congress is over “one-million”
dollars (Ballotpedia). I hope that my findings and comparisons of these two models in the
United States context will ultimately support future research regarding the most efficient
and ethical method of representation.
There are many factors that have been identified in recent research that attempt to
explain why legislators choose to adopt either a more trustee or a more delegate model of
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representation. For example, if a representative is being elected in a state or district that is
more heterogenous, that individual will be more likely to adopt a mindset of trustee
representation since it would be virtually impossible to identify a “single district opinion”
(Cooper et al 178). Other variables that may alter a legislator’s perspective on
representation and their accountability to the interests of their constituents could be
distance from the state capital, a salient minority identity such as gender or race, or the
strength of one’s own ideology (Cooper et al. 178). Overall, it is clear that representation
is still being debated in the United States today, and even more so in the wake of Donald
Trump’s presidential campaign and subsequent election in which his campaign was based
on appealing to the general masses and criticizing the political establishment and elites in
D.C, and hopefully, my research will speak to future arguments regarding the
effectiveness of representation in the U.S.
While the Roman Senate differs from the United States Senate in that it is not a
legislative body, the argument between the Populares and the Optimates is similar to the
American conflict between a delegate model of representation, in which elected officials
should directly represent and vote on the interests of their constituents, versus a trustee
model of representation, where politicians are elected not to mirror the opinions of their
constituents, but because they possess the “most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of society”(Madison).
Differences in the Function of the Senate
While it may be tempting to conflate the Senate of the Roman Republic with the
United States Senate, it is crucial to highlight that these two institutions actually operate
quite differently in their respective nations and ultimately, enlist different procedures to
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influence lawmaking. The main difference between these two governing bodies is that the
Senate of the Roman Republic is not a legislative institution and does not have the direct
power to create and establish laws. When analyzing the argument of which body of
individuals, either the senators or the mass population that they are governing on behalf
of, should carry more power in the creation of laws, it is beneficial to understand the
specific government structure, such as the processes and political offices, utilized by the
Romans in order to best understand the argument of the Optimates and the Populares.
Where the Roman Senate serves mostly as an advising body who possesses no ability to
pass or enact laws, the United States Senate is a full legislative institution. This
distinction is important to make because it helps inform my research and understand
where these two different debates between the Optimates and the Populares and the
trustee and delegate model diverge whereas the Optimates are concerned with attaining
more power in the creation of laws meanwhile in the U.S., the Senate is the sole
institution making laws.
In the United States, the Senate, along with the House of Representatives, serves
as a legislative body in which senators and elected officials, representing different
constituencies across all 50 states, are tasked to create and pass federal laws. In order for
a law to be enacted, the proposed bill must be argued and approved in both legislative
houses. The Senate specifically was allotted the power to ratify treaties and approve
presidential appointments while the House had the ability to originate revenue bills
(Ginsberg 45). Additionally, senators were elected for six-year terms, as opposed to only
two-year terms for those in the House and were required to be thirty years of age, likely
to ensure that elected officials are qualified and have the experience to adequately serve a
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longer term in the Senate which seems to support the Trustee model. The United States’
legislative branch was designed not only to hold the most power in governance so as to
avoid the concentration of power in the executive and provide an avenue for a tyrant, but
it also was meant to appease both the Federalists and Antifederalists, who were arguing
over the expectations of representation in their newly independent country.
On the one hand, the House of Representatives was meant to speak to and calm
the fears of the Antifederalists who were worried that the interests of the common people
would be undermined by the interests of elites. Since the House is composed of
representatives whose quantity are dependent on the population size of a specific state
and who represent specific districts within that state, it is meant to be more “directly
responsible” to the people and in turn, better represents the direct opinions of the people
themselves (Ginsberg 45). However, on the other hand, the Senate was originally created
with the goals of framers like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in mind so as to
ensure that qualified individuals were put in these positions and were not subject to the
pressure of the masses and factions. It was composed of elected officials who are elected
for longer and staggered terms in which only a certain number of new legislators are
chosen each year as so as to avoid mob rule within the Senate. This system ultimately
serves to ensure that the institution is not falling to the whims of the people since the
composition of the Senate changes partially each election year. Additionally, senators
were originally appointed by state legislators in order to again deter against the will of
people whose ever-changing opinions were thought to be a threat to the stability and
legitimacy in government. The 17th Amendment altered this practice though, and instead
ensured that from that point on senators would be elected by a popular vote, creating the
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system that is utilized today. Ultimately though, the current United States Senate, unlike
the Senate of the Roman Republic, is an institution meant solely for legislative purposes.
In terms of the Roman Republic, the structure of governance acts as a stark
contrast to that of the United States, especially within the institution of the Senate.
However, the Romans created a system that depended on the election of officials, and
utilized aspects of our modern concept of democracy, such as the fact that each citizen
received one vote. In an attempt to replace the king in the 6th century BCE, the founders
of the Roman Republic established the positions of two consuls, who would possess the
highest executive authority in the state. The consuls had the power of imperium or the
control of the military, and also were positioned as the head of the Senate and had the
ability to propose legislation. The terms of the consul lasted only one year, but they were
eligible for re-election in later and eventually non-consecutive years, and they were
elected by the popular assemblies. Finally, up until a piece of legislation passed in 342
BCE requiring that one of the consuls be a plebian, only members of the patrician class
were permitted to serve as consul. The position of the consul worked closely with the
Roman Senate and played a major role in politics and the future conflicts between the
Optimates and Populares.
Through this legislation, Roman governance was mandating a form of descriptive
representation, which means that a representative expresses the same characteristics or in
this case socioeconomic status as the people they are serving. This differs from the
United States where there is no requirement that representatives must be descriptive of
their constituents, and this brings up a significant facet of the debate regarding the
Optimates and the Populares and the Trustee model and the Delegate model. While it

25

seems that the Populares and the Antifederalists argue that the will of the people ought to
be directly represented in governance, neither one of these ideologies seem to necessitate
that an elected official “look like” their constituents in order to represent them.
Additional officials called magistrates were elected in order to handle the
administrative and financial aspects of Rome. These positions include aediles, quaestors,
and praetors, and these positions were elected by large assemblies of the people such as
the comitia centuriata and the comitia populi tributa. These assemblies, which each
enlisted their own unique voting system, each elected different political offices which
provides insight into which assembly and which elected officials are thinking more about
the interests of the Roman people at whole. For example, the comitia centuriata elected
the most senior magistrates such as the consuls and the praetors and voting in this
assembly was dominated by Rome’s wealthiest men who held more voting power. On the
other hand, the comitia populi tributa elected minor magistrates like the aediles, tribunes,
and quaestors, and in this assembly, which represented the “populus divided into tribes,”
voting power was equal and not based on wealth (Le Glay et al. 59). Therefore, it seems
likely that in assemblies like the former, the interests of the people were better
represented, and minor magistrates might be more responsive to the will of the people.
Additionally, it is significant to acknowledge the in assemblies like the comitia centuriata
where the wealthiest citizens had greater influence, the interests of the aristocrats were
being reflected in these magistrates. However, maybe this was acting in a similar fashion
to the United States Senate when the State legislators would appoint the Senators so as to
ensure that the elected offices are not falling to the wills of the people. Overall though,
Roman assemblies were the places in which citizens could cast their ballot, especially
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since Rome functioned as a direct democracy in the sense that citizens themselves casted
their vote to ratify the proposals coming out the Senate and make them laws. However,
citizens themselves could not create laws. It was in these assemblies where legislation
would be proposed and then subsequently voted on and enacted.
Resulting from the Conflict of the Order between the patricians and the plebeians,
a plebeian assembly was created called the concilium plebis and from this came the
creation of a new political office called the tribune of the plebs. Two tribunes would be
elected for one-year terms in which their sole purpose was to protect the interests of the
plebeians and guard them from the abuse of the aristocratic class. Along with the ability
to propose legislation and the law ensuring the protection of the tribunes, the most
notable power of the tribunes was their ability to veto the actions and acts of the
magistrates, including the consul, and the Senate. The establishment of the tribune of the
plebs marked a major event for the Populares, and this political office plays a significant
role in ensuring that the voice of both the people and the Populares is represented in
governance.
Finally, the Senate occupied a significant space in Roman government even
though it did not technically possess the ability to pass and enact laws. As opposed to the
function of the United States’ Senate as a legislative body, the Roman Senate acted more
as an advisory body in which the senators would offer their opinion through decrees
called senatus consulta to the magistrates. While these decrees did not hold any legal
power whatsoever, the opinion of the Senate held a large weight and influence in Roman
governance, and most of the time their opinions were enforced. The Senate had a large
control on the actions of the magistrates, especially considering that many senators were
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appointed to the Senate after serving as a magistrate of some kind and played a large
hand in advising military and financial matters. However since laws were voted on in
popular assemblies, it was not theoretically necessary to consult the Senate in order to
vote or pass a law, which was shown in the case of Tiberius Gracchus who, as tribune of
the plebs, took his legislation straight to the plebeian assembly knowing they would
supported his cause, and completely side stepped the approval of the Roman Senate.
Additionally, the Roman Senate was mainly composed of members of aristocratic Rome,
even though in later years plebeians were permitted to be appointed to the Senate.
Overall, the Roman Senate and their opinion held a large weight in Rome and
their guidance was usually obeyed and subsequently translated into law. However, it is
crucial for this research to understand that the United States Senate is not synonymous to
the Roman Senate, and in fact, they both function differently. In the same vein though, it
is clear that the same questions could be proposed in both contexts regarding whether one
group of people is more equipped than another group to make decisions on behalf of a
nation. In the case of the United States, whether representatives should be making
decisions based on their own beliefs or the beliefs of the people while in the case of
Rome, the conflict surrounds whether the decree of the Senators ought to be more
influential in lawmaking. Ultimately, my research attempts to draw similarities between
these political debates in both contexts in order to better understand which form of
representation if most effective.
The Framing of the Optimates and Populares
As previously outlined, the majority of evidence regarding the existence of the
Populares and the Optimates and their specific ideologies comes from the written
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accounts of prominent, and generally elite, politicians and historians. Individuals like
Caesar and Cicero, who were figureheads for the Populares and Optimates respectively,
were writing first-hand accounts of the political happenings and opinions of the time.
Meanwhile, historians like Livy and Sallust were reflecting back and documenting their
take on key moments in Rome’s history which inadvertently includes commentary on the
nature of the competing political factions of the time. Therefore, it is from these writings
that I determine the key values and issues that defined these two schools of thought in the
Late Roman Republic and how the arguments for each group were constructed and
defended. Ultimately, I identified trends in the language utilized by these ancient authors
and orators that outlined the strengths and weaknesses of Roman governance, and then
compared these findings to the language used to talk about representation in the
American context.
For my research, I focused on the primary analysis of letters, speeches, and
historical accounts written in the first century BCE from four previously mentioned
sources: Marcus Tullius Cicero, Julius Caesar, Livy, and Sallust. Coding for specific
words, language, or ideas in these authors in their original Latin, I was able to trace key
trends that help us categorize the beliefs and values of the Optimates or Populares, along
with sentiments regarding the way in which Roman government ought to be structured
and the values on which Rome was founded. In particular, I analyzed six different
sources: Cicero’s Pro Sestio and Epistulae ad Atticum (Letters to Atticus), Julius Caesar’s
Bellum Civile, Sallust’s De Coniuratione Catilinae (Conspiracy of Cataline) and Bellum
Jugurthinum (Jugurthine War), and Livy’s History of Rome in order to determine how
these authors thought about Roman government ought to be structured. I ultimately
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identified five categories and those include 1) any language explicitly referring to or
describing the Optimates, 2) language explicitly referring to or describing the Populares,
3) language describing the ideals of the Republic or facets of the Republic, 4) language
outlining good citizens, and 5) language outlining bad citizens. Ultimately, these five
subsects allowed me to not only define the main arguments that framed the ideologies of
these two political factions, but also key perspectives on the expectations of the Roman
government and the Roman citizens which will inform my discussion on American
governance and representation.
I will begin by reporting my findings regarding the way in which these ancient
authors spoke about the Optimates and Populares directly. The majority of my findings
on this topic came from the two primary sources of Cicero’s Pro Sestio and Caesar’s
Bellum Civile. These two sources provide interesting distinctions because, as previously
alluded to in my chapter outlining the historical background of these groups, Cicero
represents a figurehead for the Optimates while Caesar aligns himself with the Populares
so therefore these two writings presented two competing depictions of the Roman Senate
and those who believed it ought to hold the most power. Cicero provides a quite glowing
description of the role of the Roman Senate and the men who serve in this institution
while still acknowledging that those acting as Senators are of a different class and do not
descriptively represent the people who they are governing.
On a basic level, Cicero directly uses the term optimates multiple times
throughout the course of his legal speech Pro Sestio, which actually translates to
“aristocrats” or “the best ones” to reference the group of individuals who make up the
Roman Senate. Similarly, he makes mention of the optimates explicitly as a group almost
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ten times in his Letters to Atticus. Therefore, he does not shy away from conceding that
the Senate maintains the legacy of the patrician class and is mainly exclusive to elites.
Interestingly though, Cicero argues against the idea that the Senate are a natio or a
“breed,” (217) which he states is a term coined by his opponents, and instead he refers to
these men as delectis preciouses or “picked and chief men,” arguing that there is no
reason that the people should disagree with the views of these aristocrats (177). The
historian Sallust acknowledges the legacy of the patrician class referencing how they
were forced to appeal to the common people in Rome’s early history and how that early
class division has led to current state of political affairs between the Senate and the
Roman citizens. Ultimately, the distinction between the aristocratic Senate and plebeians
is made clear here, and their arguments are further driven home in these authors
descriptions of the institution of the Senate itself.
Cicero and Caesar engage quite different language when describing the
Optimates, the actions of the Senate, and the role the Senate plays in Roman governance.
As one could predict, Cicero views the Roman Senate as an indispensable institution that
employs only the best men to ensure the safety and integrity of Rome. To that point, he
refers to the men who take part in political affairs, meaning the Senators and magistrates,
as the boni homines or the “good people”, and he uses this term which seems to be used
synonymously with the Optimates roughly seven times throughout the course of his
speech. This comparison of the Roman senators as “good people” seems to argue that this
group of individuals are morally superior to the rest of the Roman population. The
implications of this language is to separate the two populations, the Senate and the
People, and to also promote the argument, whether true or not, that the Senate is not a
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corrupt institution. He goes on to detail how he views the role of the Senate in which he
likens them to “defenders of the State” or propugnatores (173) along with fulfilling the
roles of custodem and praesidum meaning the guardian and the president (225). Through
these descriptions, it is clear that Cicero perceives the Senate to be the most suitable and
qualified body of citizens to manage and protect the Roman State and uphold its values
and foundations. Furthermore, Cicero even goes as far to assert that the optimates or
aristocrats are the auctores et conservatores civitatis or the “counsellors and saviors the
State” which seems to be fit in nicely with the narrative of the Optimates in which they
believe that the Senate possess greater wisdom than the general public that ought to hold
greater weight in making decisions and creating laws (225). These terms are significant to
our understanding of the ideology of the Optimates as they seek to argue the moral and
ethical nature of the Roman Senate and its senators that makes it more suitable for
governance than the Roman people.
Caesar paints a different picture of the Optimates and the Senate, highlighting his
perspective on the institution’s shortcomings and the frequency of immoral behavior
among these elite individuals who made up the Roman Senate. For context, Caesar is
writing in the midst of his public conflict with Pompey which eventually turns into a
Civil War between the two parties. Caesar had spent an unprecedented ten years,
following his consulship in 59 BCE, as governor of Transalpine Gaul in which he was
engaging in successful military campaigns into what they called Northern Gaul (Le Glay
et al. 148). While Caesar and Pompey had formerly been allies with one another in a
three-way coalition with Marcus Crassus known as the First Triumvirate, their
relationship soon began to deteriorate for numerous reasons as Caesar began gaining
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military fame for his work in Gaul while Pompey chose to remarry, only after the death
of his previous wife Julia who was Caesar’s only daughter, to a woman from the Metelli
family who were political opponents of Caesar and prominent members of the Optimates.
By the year 52 BCE, due to a new abundance of violence and unrest, Pompey is
appointed sole consul and ultimately, aligns himself with the Optimates in the Roman
Senate. With Caesar’s governorship expiring, the Senate saw this as an opportunity to
neutralize him and demanded that he lay down his command and release his legions to
which Caesar himself refused and ultimately requested to run for consul in absentia, so as
to avoid the legal prosecution he would face if he returned home to Rome. Ultimately,
while Pompey declared that he would lay down his command if Caesar did, Caesar ended
up crossing the border and marching his troops across the Rubicon River, establishing a
civil war.
Ultimately, Caesar’s Bellum Civile details his perspective of the Roman Senate
and Pompey regarding their efforts to eliminate him from Roman Politics, along with
attempting to justify how the actions he took against the Optimates were necessary and
on behalf of the people. It is clear throughout this commentary that Caesar felt as though
the Roman people wanted him in office and that the Senate was abusing their specified
role in governance in order to attain more power. For example, Caesar, interrupting
Lentulus Spinther who was begging for his life, proclaimed that he did not leave his
province with the intentions of harm, but instead wished to “restore the tribunes” and “to
liberate [himself] and the Roman people from the oppression by a small faction” (35).
This passage alone cements Caesar’s perspective of the Roman Senate, and highlights
that he feels as though he is responsible to fight on behalf of the people.
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Therefore, it is understandable that he mainly highlights the Senate’s abuse of
power in his writings in hopes of exposing their corrupt behavior that contradicts
Cicero’s moral and superior depiction of the Optimates. Specifically, he outlines
individual motives for prominent Senators like Lucius Lenutlus whose motives Caesar
claims for persecuting him were based on personal motives such as becoming a second
Sulla and gaining summa imperi or “supreme power” (7). He goes after Scipio and argues
that he only backed Pompey because of his desire to attain "provincarum atque
exercitum" or provinces and armies. Along that same vein, Caesar claims that the
Senators prefer to maintain their imperium exercitusque or “power and armies” even it
means utter confusion and turmoil for the State (7). In terms of the character of the
Senate, he believes them to be tenuis atque infirmi haec animi or “petty and weak of
mind,” along with mentioning their harshness, which ultimately presents a stark contrast
to Cicero’s evaluation (51). This difference in opinions regarding the actions and moral
composition of these two political factions continues throughout both of these texts in
their evaluations of the Populares.
It seems also important to mention as well that Sallust subtly alludes to the
Optimates at least three times in his text detailing the Conspiracy of Catiline, arguing that
governance in Rome began to be shift to paucorum potentia meaning the “power of a
few” which echoes Caesar’s language regarding “the power of a few” and a “small
faction” (85). This idea is a critique of the way in which the Senate only are composed of
a small class of citizens who are the elites, and this group ultimately ends up having a
larger influence in governance and lawmaking than the common people of Rome who are
the majority. This concept is important to keep in mind as it will be referenced again in
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the American context and utilized as an argument against the Federalists and their
preference of a more elite model of representation.
Cicero employs quite scathing language when speaking explicitly about both the
character of the Populares, but also of the actions they commit that ultimately makes
them ill fit to govern the State properly. He refers to them explicitly as the Populares,
which could be translated either “Friends of the People” or “The People’s Party,” which
seems to be presented with a negative connotation. This is important distinction to keep
in mind as a similar dialogue is employed by the Federalists to describe the
Antifederalists, along with negative comparisons to Caesar himself. Additionally, I would
like to point out that this language seems to separate the leaders of the Populares from the
people themselves which again feeds into the argument of descriptive representation.
Even though Caesar was a prominent leader for the Populares faction, he too was part of
the aristocratic class and did not descriptively look like the people of Rome whom he was
trying the defend. I think it could be argued that this language seems to say that members
of the Populares are not necessarily the common Roman people, but instead, are
individuals who are friends to these people and uses their interests to gain power. He
utilizes this term at least twelve times throughout the excerpt of this legal speech in
which he engages the ongoing conflict between the two factions.
After he outlines the glowing characteristics held by the Optimates or the
aristocrats, Cicero compares those who are seeking to go against these aristocrats, or the
Senate are audaces homines et perditi or “reckless and abandoned men” who are going
against the State (171). Additionally, he scolded those actively working against the
Optimates for their cunctatione ac tarditate or “hesitance and indolence” (173). From
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this understanding, he seems to be arguing that those who choose to defy the will of the
Senate are ultimately hurting the State of Rome, clearly emphasizing the Senate’s
important and incomparable role in governance. We saw how this played out for the
Gracchus brothers who chose to go against the Senate, and ultimately, I believe Cicero is
arguing that these types of individuals threaten to cause revolutions and danger to the
state of Rome. Additionally, he is clearly identifying the qualities and characteristics that
make these individuals unfit for advising and influencing lawmaking.
Cicero continues on by stating that the ways in which leaders of the Populares
mobilize the people and gain support is only through pretio and mercede or “corruption
and bribery” (179). This speech argues that the Optimates viewed the leaders of the
Populares as inciting the masses against the Senate and playing on the fears and
grievances of the people in order to gain power in governance and eliminate the
Optimates from governance. From these words, it does not seem like Cicero believes that
the Populares are even representing the true beliefs of the people, but instead, are buying
their support in order to undermine the power of the aristocratic Senate. For example, it is
notable to say that many of the leaders of the Populares faction, like Caesar, had
aristocratic backgrounds and do not represent the socioeconomic status of the general
Roman person. Cicero then chooses to drive his point home by calling out by name
specific Populares leaders who are, in his opinion, immoral such as L. Gellius or L.
Saturninus. He refers to them as ringleaders and “demagogues” or plebicola in the
original Latin, along with mad men who flourish in popular esteem and persuasion (187).
Similarly, he also references key players in the creation of the Populares faction such as
Gaius Gracchus, along with Marcus Varius, whom Cicero refers to as seditiosis or
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“revoluntionaries” (173). As previously mentioned, Cicero is using these examples to
warn against the dangers that occur when the will of the Senate is not followed.
Providing another and perhaps more objective perspective, the historian Livy also
mentions Gaius Gracchus, along with his brother Tiberius, in his documentation of
Roman history, and seems to present a different perspective regarding these early
politicians. He argues that the Gracchus brothers put the rem publicam or the “public
good over their own personal interests or “private animosity” (Livy bk.38, 53). Clearly,
Cicero and Livy had two different opinions regarding who has the best interests of Rome
in mind with Cicero siding with the Senate. Overall though, Cicero drives his point home
by highlighting the mentes imperatorum or the “minds of the inexperienced” or ignorant
who have been corrupted by bribery meaning the common people of Rome (227).
Therefore, I argue that this sums up the overarching belief of the Populares from the
Optimates point of view, believing that the people are not wise or experienced enough to
make decisions on what is best for Rome, and they utilize immoral behaviors to attain
power.
On the other hand, Caesar does not seem to engage as much with a description of
the Populares except when he is describing himself, a member of the Populares faction,
and justifying his own actions. Basically, he lauds his exsitimationem dignitatumque or
“dignity and reputation” especially in his role as commander of his army for the past nine
years, and even states that he had only reckoned with “dignity of the republic of first
importance and preferable to life" (Caesar 15). Caesar seems to be distinguishing himself
as a man who has the interests of the Republic at heart, as opposed to the self-interest
Senate that he previously called out, and he also is fighting back against the corrupt
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description that Cicero provides of Populares leaders such as his desire to restore the
fundamental rights of the tribunes of the plebs (35). Finally, Caesar states that the way in
which he is going to outdo the decisions of the Senate that is actively working against
him is with iustitia et aequitate or “justice and equity” (51). He seems to be once again
attempting to affirm that he is only making these military moves against the Senate and
Pompey specifically because he believes that it is in the best interest of the people of
Rome. Overall though, Caesar does not explicitly mention anything regarding the beliefs
of the Populares, but instead chooses to speak about his commendable character which
serves as a contrast to Cicero’s portrayal of Populares politicians. However, both Caesar
and Cicero, along with Sallust, go into great detail about what constitutes a good citizen
and bad citizen, which one can only infer is meant to subtly describe the members of their
opposing political ideology.
Interestingly, Cicero and Caesar both present similar language regarding the
characteristics of an ideal citizen even though they both seemed to be referencing
different groups of people who exemplify these traits. For Cicero, these qualities were
exemplified by the Roman Senate, and were the traits that made them better equipped to
make decisions for the state. He emphasizes that this aristocratic class is integrii or
“virtuous” and sapientibus or “wise” (223). Similarly, he advises that men ought to
imitate these qualities of the Roman Senate, or as he calls them “the leading men of the
State,” such as their dignitatem, laudem, and gloriam meaning “dignity, praise, and
glory” (157). Cicero argues that because the Senate possess these qualities, they do
indeed defend the interests of the people. Similarly, in order to accommodate and
advocate for the various interests and needs of the people, one must have magni animi,

38

magni ingenii, magnae constantiae meaning an “exalted spirit, great ability, and great
resolution,” which is what these aristocratic men have according to Cicero (171). This
again serves to elevate the Roman senators and their character above that of the Roman
people in hopes of proving that they are more qualified to create laws.
Similarly, Caesar also agrees that dignitatem is a quality of the ideal citizen and
unsurprisingly, something that he himself strives for, claiming it is “dearer than life
itself” (Cicero 17). That is the extent of how these two politicians view an ideal citizen
and those fit for governance. However, Sallust seems to provide a broader view of the
qualities that describe a good citizen, and values that men should strive to attain. Like
Cicero and Caesar, Sallust talk about dignitas or “dignity,” specifically in terms of the
Senators, in his work on the war against Catiline (111). Additionally, he mentions pudore
and virtutue meaning “modesty and virtue” as morals that were found in politics and
governance when he first joined in this field as a young man (25). He argues that the
government authority, most likely including the Roman Senate, formerly was the optumo
and iutissumo or the “best and most just” (37). More generally, in his work The War
Against Jugurtha, Sallust identifies honesty, diligence, and virtue again as good qualities
of moral men that one ought to strive for. Overall though, Sallust frames these traits as
things of the past and begins to outline the values that categorize the Roman governance
at the time of his writing.
In a similar fashion, Cicero outlines negative qualities that represent a bad citizen
which he attributes to those who support the Populares ideology or the general public.
Specifically, he points out the temeritatem of the people or the “rashness and
thoughtlessness,” saying that the Senate dreaded the “impetuosity of the masses” (Cicero
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177). This supports the line of thought adopted by the Optimates who believe that the
Senate possesses the correct temperament and values that are ideal for governance, and
therefore, they should have a larger influence in lawmaking. Meanwhile, they also
believed that the general masses were not suitable for governance and did not have the
right nature to make the best decisions for Rome. Additionally, Cicero touches upon the
cupiditas or the “desires” of the people, and how those desires do not agree with the
opinions of the leading men. Again, I believe Cicero is attempting to argue that the
common people allow their own personal desires supersede the interests of the State and
therefore, make them unfit for lawmaking.
Finally, Cicero addresses the threat of conversiones and seditio meaning
“revolution and riots,” arguing that in contrast to the leading men with great and sound
minds, talking about the Senate, there are some men who wish to incite revolution and
change the government (185). He goes on to explain how these men who wish to
overthrow the government either are involved in criminal behavior, financial
embarrassment, or have an inborn revolutionary madness (Cicero, 104). He says this in
contrast to the “great” and “exalted” that the Roman senators possess, therefore providing
a clear moral distinction between the two groups of people. It is clear that Cicero is
depicting the men who are attacking the Roman Senate as amoral and less equipped to
make laws.
Caesar speaks only briefly about his perspective on the less desirable traits of the
aristocrats who he deems as bad citizens. Specifically, he employs the same language
Cicero did previously to describe the masses and accuses the Senate or possessing an
acerbitatem or “harshness” that has been unfairly inflicted upon him and the people (51).
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Additionally and more broadly, he accuses the Senate of having tenuis atque infirmi haec
animi or “petty and feeble character” more specifically in the context of their willingness
to align with Pompey’s wishes (51). However, it is interesting that Caesar seems to
employ similar rhetoric to describe the Optimates and the ways in which they fall short as
Roman citizens, clearly attempting to expose their corrupt nature.
Sallust also supports this line of thought in “The Conspiracy of Cataline,” and
argues that the politics of the Late Roman Republic have been contaminated with
corruption and immoral men. He speaks of largitio and avaritia meaning “bribery and
greed,” and how he found these values in politics when he joined as a young man (25).
Similarly, he also speaks about how luxuria or “extravagance” is what spurred Cataline
on in his actions against Roman governance (29). Referring specifically to the Roman
government which most likely includes the Roman Senate, Sallust states that he has seen
cruel and intolerable men. Finally, he also asserts that ignoble men will use dolis atque
fallaciis meaning “craft and deception” in order to gain power and political office,
seemingly arguing that these men are in existence in the Roman Republic (37). These are
Sallust’s perceptions regarding the decline of morality in politics since the expulsion of
the kings to the Late Roman Republic in which he is writing, so it seems relevant to
include these evaluations in our discussion.
Lastly, these authors briefly also touch upon the values and ideals that Rome itself
was built upon which serve to remind the author not only the important facets of
government, but also how these different political groups are attempting to preserve these
ideas. For Cicero, he highlights the protection of libertatem or “liberty, “and how the
Senators are always attempting to ensure the liberty and the wishes of the people of
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Rome (225). Additionally, Cicero does argue that the Senate is upholding the “judgment
of the Roman people” or the iudicium populi which legitimizes the Roman government
and claims that the Populares are not actually friends of the people after all (189). This
seems to be a fair analysis considering that many of the Populares leaders also come from
privileged backgrounds, and in actions such as Caesar’s, it seems that the support of the
people is used as a way in which an individual can gain more personal power and detract
power from the Senate.
Caesar also touches upon ideals and guarantees of the Roman Republic. More
specifically, he shifts his focus onto how government ought to be making decisions rei
publicae causa and rei publicae commode meaning for the “sake of the commonwealth”
and to the “Republic’s advantage” which he actually claims that this is what Pompey
thought he was doing when he was going against Caesar (17). Additionally though,
Caesar adds that it was not only in the interest of the Republic, but also the communis
salutis or “general welfare” that him and Pompey have a face to face interaction and
restore order (39). Speaking more generally, Sallust affirms these ideas that the iussi
populi or “order of the people” is a key facet of the Republic and gives the Senate and
magistrates their power (67).
Overall, these five categories outline the language that was utilized by politicians
and historians of the Late Roman Republic to understand and critique both the Optimates
and Populares schools of thought, along with the health of Roman governance in general.
I argue that this analysis has allowed for a more in depth understanding of how people
thought about these two political factions, and how members from these ideologies
argued in favor of themselves and their perspective on the representation and lawmaking.
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Ultimately, these identified words and phrases will serve useful in identifying similarities
among the perspectives and implementation of representation in the American context,
and how that comparison can inform our modern view on the effectiveness and role of
the United States Senate.
Comparison to the 18th Century United States
Switching gears, I wanted to compare my findings from the Late Roman
Republic, and the arguments presented by the Optimates and the Populares, to my
findings from the American context and the differing perspectives regarding
representation in the United States. Specifically, I chose to draw my focus to written texts
from the early years after America’s founding that not only established the expectations
and role of elected representatives, but also revealed conflicting opinions regarding how
institutions like the Senate should be set up. I looked at key documents such as the
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution in order to understand
the explicit language regarding this political debate. Additionally, I utilized two texts
from Hamilton, Madison, and Jay’s collection of essays defending the Constitution
known as the Federalist Papers, along with two anonymous essays by authors with
pseudonyms, known by the names “Federal Farmer” and “Brutus,” who present the
Antifederalist’s perspective and concerns with this new governing document.
Specifically, I am looking to highlight the language and arguments employed by
these early politicians and political factions that explained their views on the most
effective structure of representation and their opinions on the Trustee versus Delegate
model of Representation in order to compare trends in logic and rhetoric between that of
the Optimates and Populares. I utilized roughly the same five coding categories that I
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used in the Roman context to analyze these primary sources, amending them a bit to
better capture the subject matter and institutions that these authors are writing about.
Therefore, the categories I chose included 1) the language used to describe qualities that
representatives ought to have, 2) qualities of the common people, 3) the ideals or facets
of democracy that the country was built on, and 4) explicit references or arguments for or
against both Trustee and Delegate models of representation. Overall, I was able to find
many instances of overlap between the language and ideology of the political debate laid
out in the Roman Republic and that which categorized the years following America’s
founding. This comparison seeks to show a clear line of thought between the competing
political ideologies that categorized the Roman republic and the United States, and
highlights the significance in drawing connections to these ancient cultures.
Similar to the Roman authors and politicians, these documents expend a
considerable amount of time outlining the specific values and tenets of democracy that
are crucial to the success and health of the United States which should not come as a
surprise since this is the time period when American governance was being constructed
and amended. Many of these ideas share the same sentiments and ideals of those outlined
in the Late Roman Republic with even some authors like Hamilton and Madison
explicitly stating their inspiration from Ancient Greece and Rome. For example,
Hamilton consumed a significant amount of the writings of philosophers in his time, one
of whom being Cicero (Chernow 110). The Declaration of Independence mainly serves
as a compelling source for these ideas, outlining values like “safety” along with “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” as important foundations for their new government,
similar to how Cicero speaks about the importance of libertatem or “liberty” in the Pro
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Sestio. Significantly, the document twice highlights the “right(s) of the people,” for the
purpose of calling out the British government’s previous abuse of these rights and
emphasizing the people’s rights to alter of abolish this new government as Thomas Paine
spelled out in his pamphlet “Common Sense” (Declaration). I argue this is similar in
nature to Cicero’s mention to the “judgement of the people” in which both arguments are
clearly acknowledging the importance of the people’s voice in governance (Cicero 189).
Federalist Paper 57 also reaffirms this belief by speaking about the “responsibility
to the people” that representatives have in their role which again endorses the idea that
the opinions of the people are embedded into governance in both Rome and the United
States. This document also speaks that the men serving in American governance must
have the virtue and character to pursue “the common good of society” which draws
comparisons back to Cicero’s argument in favor of the Optimates, claiming that these
aristocratic men or Senators are ultimately making decisions on what is best for the State.
Cicero creates a list of the characteristics and morals that the Roman Senate possess that
make them more qualified for governance, and Madison seems to be partially buying into
that argument in the sense that representatives must have merit and virtue in order to
serve.
The Constitution of the United States also offers important ideas and values that
the founders were hoping to establish in this new government such as providing for the
“common defense” and “promot[ing] the general welfare” along with reiterating again
the protection of “liberty” (Constitution). This is practically plucked from the pages of
Caesar’s Bellum Civile where he speaks about the “interest of the people and the general
welfare” of the State (39). Like Cicero, the founders of American democracy thought that
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government ought to both preserve the values that the country was built on and
acknowledged the significance of the judgement of the people in governance.
Moving on, I shifted my focus to coding not only the specific expectations of
representatives clearly delineated in the Constitution, but also the differing perspectives
regarding the ideal character of representatives. Thinking more specifically in terms of
explicit responsibilities and requirements of representatives, the Constitution spells out
the age requirements of 25 and 30 that one must be in order to be elected to the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, along with duties that are exclusive to either
chamber such as the House’s authority to “originate revenue bills” or the Senate’s “sole
power to try all impeachments” (Constitution). Additionally in section 8, the Constitution
also grants the United States Congress what is known as implied powers by stating that
these two institutions have the power to make all laws which they deem “necessary and
proper” (Constitution). This has been a source for major debate where Alexander
Hamilton argued for an expansive understanding of this clause in order to “free
government from unforeseen emergencies” (Chernow 355). On the other hand, Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison, who helped author the Constitution and the clause itself,
argued for a more restrictive interpretation of the law and thought that all policies must
pass a “strict test of being absolutely necessary” so as to avoid the legislative branch from
acquiring too much power (Chernow 355). Hamilton argued against that notion, citing the
difficulty in objectively determining if something is necessary which seems like a fair
critique. From this language alone that is employed in the Constitution, it seems that the
Constitution is promoting a more Trustee model of representation by including this rather
vague clause which seems to allow representatives to use their own discretion when
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creating laws. Additionally, there seems to be no explicit mention of a representative’s
responsibility to act solely or at all on their constituent’s interests.
Federalist Paper 57 and Federalist Paper 10 both provide the Federalists’
argument in favor of the way representation was structured in the Constitution while also
attempting to dispel the criticism regarding their preference for a Trustee model. In
Federalist 10, Madison spends some time outlining the qualities of men who are to be
chosen as representatives such as “patriotism” and a “love of justice” (Madison). More
significantly though, he argues that this chosen group of individuals must have “wisdom”
so that they are able to “discern the true interest” of the country which gets right to the
argument of the Trustee model and also presents similar logic to the Optimates school of
thought. They are arguing that these representatives or those in governance, in the case of
Rome, are more equipped and knowledgeable than the common people to make decisions
in the best interest of their countries and therefore, ought to use that wisdom to have a
greater influence in lawmaking. Similarly, this document also claims that rulers must
possess the “most virtue” in order to pursue “the common good of the society” which
goes hand in hand with the argument used by Cicero to support the Roman Senate and the
Optimates. Similar to Madison, Cicero also mentioned the Senate’s integri or “virtue,
upright” nature, and both men clearly found this quality to be a cornerstone to the best
means of governance.
Federalist Paper 57 seems to present a defense against the claim that the Trustee
model of representation will breed only an aristocratic class in governance and that the
interests of the rural citizens will not be represented. While it focuses on the House of
Representatives as opposed to the Senate, he states that the Constitution promotes the

47

“rights and pretensions” of all, even every “class and description of citizens” (Madison).
Madison goes on to argue that the people are the ones who will be electing these
representatives, and therefore, they have direct influence in what type of individual is
elected, arguing that neither the “rich, more than the poor” or the “learned, more than
ignorant” are electing these people (Madison). This seems like an important distinction to
make in terms of the Federalists’ position and the argument for a Trustee model since it
clearly delineates how the body of citizens exercise their “judgement,” as previously
mentioned, or their voice to influence legislation by choosing to vote for candidates who
are more aligned with their beliefs or who present a certain identity. This deviates from
what we saw in the context of Rome in which clearly the Roman Senate was primarily
composed of elite politicians who were born into their station in life, and the Roman
people did not have the power to vote out these aristocratic Senators out since their
appointment was for life. Therefore, it is interesting to see how Cicero and the Optimates
choose to just accept and embrace the title of aristocrats, while Madison in the Federalist
Papers is attempting to counteract that attack since American revolutionaries were
focused on rebelling against the tyranny and abuses of aristocratic Britain.
However, on the flip side, the anonymous Antifederalist author Brutus, likely
Robert Yates, in his 1787 essay “To the People of the State of New-York” offered a
somewhat different perspective on the expectation of a representative in the United States
per the Constitution. Countering the idea of representatives possessing some innate
wisdom to make decisions, Brutus argues that those in power ought to hold the “same
feelings” and “aim at the same objects as the people do,” adding that it is those people
who “transfer” them their authority (Brutus). This stance is clearly advocating for
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representation that aligns more with the Delegate model in which representatives should
be directly relying on the interests of the people to make decisions and policy. I
especially think it is significant to highlight Brutus’ argument that the people “transfer”
authority to these representatives, in which clearly he believes that the people are the
ones giving the officials their power and therefore, these officials are responsible to honor
that symbiotic relationship. This line of thought seems to closely resemble the beliefs of
the Populares who claim that the opinions of the people should ultimately have the
greatest say in governance, and it is the people, or as Sallust puts it in The Conspiracy of
Cataline, the populi iussi or “order to the people,” who gives the consul and the
magistrates power (67).
Moving forward, in support of their argument for the Trustee model, Federalist
Paper 10 also seems to briefly touch upon the perceived characteristics, actions, and
capabilities of the common people and the masses that make them ill equipped to
recognize what is in the best interest of the State and to ultimately, influence governance.
Specifically, Madison highlights the danger in the formation of factions among the
people, and that the “violence of factions” can only be repressed by a “well-constructed
union” (Madison). Adding to his argument, he goes on to present the fear of an
“interested and overbearing majority” who will overtake the rights or interests of a minor
party or even worse, completely neglect the public good (Madison). Clearly, Madison is
conveying his perspective on the dangers that might occur if the people yield too much
power in governance, and their interests are directly translated into laws. Instead, he
seems to be laying the foundation of the necessity for representatives who possess those
previously mentioned qualities to make decisions that are in the best interest of the
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country and do not give in to the interest of conflicting factions. This refers back to
Rehfeld’s assertion that a key component of the Trustee model of representation is that
representatives should not be reliant on “external sanctities” or parties which is exactly
what Madison is arguing here (Rehfeld 218). I also think this is a fear that was shared by
the Roman Optimates, believing that the general public did not have the qualifications to
best make decisions or laws on behalf of the State and that the multitude of differing
interests would cause chaos to governance such as when Cicero speaks to the threat of
conversiones and seditio or “revolutions” and “riots” (Pro Sestio 185).
Additionally, Madison claims that “instability, injustice, and confusion” are often
“introduced in public councils,” which he believes are the “mortal disease” of
government (Madison). This is an interesting point to make and directly refers to a
similar sentiment posed by Cicero that I had not mentioned in my previous discussion of
the Roman text. Cicero in his Pro Sestio legal speech touches upon the contiones or
“informal meetings” held by the plebeians in Rome which he claims are one of three
places in which the opinions of the people can be heard (179). These informal assemblies
have not been as heavily researched as the formal voting assemblies like the curiate,
tribal, and centuriate, but it is clear that they took up a significant space in the Roman
political process (Morstein-Marx 35). Along with serving as the “chief conduit of
authoritative information” to the common citizens, these meetings and the opinions that
came out of these meetings ultimately would make their way back to the Senate and
Magistrates and could have a large hand in deciding the fate of bills (Morstein-Marx 35).
Therefore, similar to Madison’s point, Cicero claimed that the leaders of the Populares
would use these meetings to incite the people and cause riots, ultimately fearing that they
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would undermine the authority and wisdom of the Senate in exchange for their own
selfish interests (Pro Sestio 179).
These evaluations of the character of the general public both in the Roman
context and the American context seems to argue that these politicians did not think the
majority of people were fit or possessed the right temperament to govern effectively and
they should then subsequently place their trust in the hands of those, like the Senators,
who are equipped. Hamilton seemed to support this idea as well, and even likened
Jefferson to the character and actions of Caesar. Ron Chernow states that on numerous
occasions Hamilton referred to Jefferson as Caesar, believing him to be a “populist
demagogue”(398) and “the worst sort of tyrant” (407). This is an interesting distinction to
point out for two reasons. First off, it is clear that Hamilton and most likely the other
founding fathers were both well-read and influenced by the actions of the ancient
Romans and Greeks, which is clear the similar language and government structures that
have previously been identified in my research along with the Roman and Greek
pseudonyms that were often employed in their writings. Secondly, and more importantly,
Hamilton seems to be pointing out that Jefferson does not actually represent the people
and instead, is capitalizing on his popular support. Again, this brings up whether
descriptive representation is a key facet of the delegate model of representation and the
Federalists and the Optimates seem to be pointing out this hypocrisy.
Finally, both the Federalist Papers and the two essays penned by Antifederalist
authors present specific critiques to both the concepts of a Trustee model of
representation and a Delegate model, and dive deeper into the ideological differences
between the two schools of thought. Similarly, all these texts attempt to combat the
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concerns and arguments of their conflicting viewpoint. The Antifederalist writers Brutus
and the Federal Farmer seem to focus their essays mostly on attacking the Federalist
perspective on representation, as opposed to spending too much time defending and
supporting representation that is more closely aligned with the Delegate model. Both
writers touch upon and argue this idea that a “few men of wealth” (Federal Farmer) or the
“will of a few”(Brutus) are having too great an influence in the government under the
new Constitution. Brutus argues that the number of representatives that were determined
by this new governing document is “so small a number” that it “could not resemble the
people” and their interests (Brutus).
The Federal Farmer author also brings up the differing interests and specific
identities of Southern, Eastern, and Middle states, and argues that there are such
differences in opinion and customs that will most likely be neglected by such few
representatives who cannot possibly represent the all of their views. Additionally, the
Federal Farmer actually goes so far to call these few men the “natural aristocracy of the
country” which I argue draws striking similarities to the perspectives that the Roman
Populares had regarding the Optimates who they deemed an aristocratic breed (Federal
Farmer). These two writings are confirming the fear that representatives will favor the
interests of the wealthy and not the diverse interests of the rest of the county. Ultimately,
both essays seem to be attempting to make the same argument that the middle and lower
classes will be excluded from this new method of representation.
Additionally, these texts also argue that this form of representation will breed
corruption and immorality within governance. Because of the discretion and
responsibilities allocated to representatives under the Constitution, Brutus claims that
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there will be representatives who will “pursue private ends” and will in result “sacrifice
the public good” (Brutus). The Federal Farmer supports this claim and argues that it
provides “an open door to improper regulations” (Federal Farmer). On that point, the
Federal Farmer author is referring to the fact that Congress has the power to regulate
elections and claims that people in the cities will therefore control the representatives
who are chosen, further excluding those poor citizens living in rural communities. That is
a significant point to address, and it contributes to the debate and concerns regarding the
stark class divisions between constituents and their elected officials, which clearly was
felt in the Late Roman Republic as well. These two authors do not provide a solution to
these issues or an alternative method of representation, but I argue their critiques are
significant and offers similar sentiments to the Roman Populares.
The Federalist Papers 10 and 57 both attempt to counter these claims against
them, and also provide support for the Trustee Model. In Federalist 57, Madison claims
that “merit” should be the key determinant to be a representative and that officials should
be elected on this basis. Additionally Madison supports this claim in Federalist 10, stating
that representatives must have “diffusive and established characters” which I argue feeds
into that merit which Madison mentions (Madison). This is an important tenet of the
argument for the Trustee model in which these representatives are only qualified to
employ their own personal discretion and experiences in governance because of their
objective merit and that is what keeps them from abusing their power and harming the
State. A representative’s aptitude and virtue in lawmaking is key to ensuring those values
of liberty and prosperity that the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence so
clearly laid out as the foundations of American government. Additionally, Madison
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brings up a fair argument in Federalist Paper 10 in which he states that men are not fit “to
be a judge in [their] own case” because if that were the case, there would certainly be
personal bias which would “corrupt his integrity” (Madison). Therefore, Madison argues
that the “enlightened statesmen” as he calls them must rectify this issue by not yielding
solely to the interests of the majority (Madison). While differing in the sense that Roman
Senators were not elected by the people, this perspective on the “merit” of government
officials draws comparisons to the Roman Optimates who clearly viewed themselves as
more “enlightened” than the plebeians and therefore, ought to have more influence in
lawmaking.
Finally, the Federalist Papers do seem to push back against the accusation that this
method of representation and America’s new governance as a whole created an oligarchy
or a government run by only a small group of elite individuals. Madison asserts that this
idea of an oligarchy is the “most extraordinary” and refutes this claim by asserting that
the people themselves hold the power to elect their rulers and that their aim should be
electing those with virtue. Similarly, he asks how the House of Representatives “favors
the elevation of the few,” and counters this claim by asserting that men from all
backgrounds, including socio-economic, are included in the United States electorate and
participate in choosing their own representatives. In Federalist 10, Madison actually
argues that a “small number of citizens elected by the rest” is one of the greatest facets of
a Republic. He argues that this is the best mode of representation in terms of ensuring the
“true interest of the country” while also taking into account the “public views” since the
interests of the general public can be tainted by their self-interest (Madison). This idea of
the “power of a few” was also a critique of the Roman Optimates as the Populares leaders
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and the Roman people believed that it was primarily only those born into the aristocratic
class who were able to gain entrance into significant political offices. It is a significant
connection because it further aligns the political ideologies of the Populares with those
who supported a delegate model of representation.
Overall, I argue that the debate regarding representation in the United States has
strong comparisons to the political differences of the Roman Populares and Optimates.
Not only do both contexts utilize similar ideals and values with which their government
was founded on, but it seems that similar issues regarding socioeconomic class divisions
and expectations of those who are governing are present in both time periods. Although
the political institutions and structure of governance are significantly different in Late
Roman Republic and the United States, the debates between who ought to have a greater
influence in lawmaking seems to transcend those differences. Ultimately, my research
has highlighted the trend in political thought and debate between the Roman Republic
and the United States, and hopefully, will encourage further scholarship on the
significance of drawing links to these ancient cultures.
Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, my research has identified key rhetoric and logic that connects the
conflict between the Roman Populares and Optimates to the ongoing debate in American
politics regarding the trustee model and the delegate model of representation. In
summary, the basis of the arguments employed by the Roman Optimates centered around
the idea that the Senators, mostly composed of elite aristocrats, possessed greater wisdom
and virtue than the mass of Roman citizens. Therefore, they argued that their approval
ought to be a more essential part of the lawmaking process. Similarly, early American
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political thinkers like James Madison argued for a similar stance in terms of how
representation should be constructed in the United States, favoring the Trustee model
which claimed that representative ought to possess some greater wisdom and worldview
that makes them better equipped to make decisions on behalf of the State. On the flip
side, the Roman Populares clearly felt like the Roman Senate was a breeding ground for
corruption and ultimately, failed to represent the interests of all citizens which I argue is
consistent with the critiques of those like the American Antifederalists who favored
representation that more closely aligns with the delegate model. This comparison
between the conflict of the Optimates and Populares and the debate between the trustee
and delegate model or representation is one that has not been highlighted in previous
research, and it was beneficial to look at these ideological similarities between these
political factions in order to better understand the most effective modes of representation.
However, even more important, I believe this research has a modern application,
especially when looking at the concerns that were presented by both ideological stances,
arguing that these are concerns that are still being debated in United States governance.
As previously highlighted throughout the course of my research, it seems that
none of these political schools of thought seem to fall short of providing descriptive
representation. Instead, the debate centers around whether the interests of the people
ought to be represented or whether it ought to be left in the hands of those who are more
experienced to govern but does not seem to require that a representative descriptively
look like their constituents. Ultimately, this opens up room for further research on
whether the lack of descriptive representation undermines the arguments of the Populares
and the Antifederalists, or if the United States ought to require this type of representation
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more explicitly like other countries have done through vehicles like quota laws or other
systems.
The key takeaway of my research is identifying the link between these two
political debates which will hopefully open up the door to future research. My findings
are simply compiling the extent and essence of the debates that categorized the Roman
Republic and the United States but does not seek to make an evaluation on which
ideology seems to be more effective and ethical in terms of governance. Hopefully, future
research can utilize my findings in order to predict future implications or consequences
by referencing the political outcomes of the Romans that the United States could face,
since it is clear that similar rhetoric and debates are still present in today’s modern
political climate. Finally, I hope that this research highlights the importance and
relevance of looking back and analyzing ancient cultures and encourages others to do the
same.
Overall, my research was successful in identifying key similarities between the
political conflict of the Roman Optimates and Populares and the conflict regarding
representation that categorized both America’s founding years and our modern political
debates. I was able to analyze similar language and rhetoric employed from both
contexts, and present a thorough understanding of the ideologies that were being argued
along with the benefits and downfalls of both methods of governance. I hope that my
research can be used to help identify ways in which we can refine the roles and
expectations of representation in the United States, so that the interests of the country are
being represented in governance over the personal interests of elected officials.
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Additionally, my findings can speak to future research regarding the quality of
representation in the United States.
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